Does goal revision undermine self-regulation through goals? An experiment

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-13 DOI:10.1007/s10683-024-09826-0

Jonas Pilgaard Kaiser, Alexander K. Koch, Julia Nafziger

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We offer a novel test of whether non-binding goals set ahead of a task are effective motivators, taking into account that individuals in principle could easily revise these goals. In our setting, subjects either set a goal some days prior to an online task (early goal) or right at the start of the task (late goal). Two further treatments allow for (unanticipated) explicit revision of the early goal. We observe that (i) early goals are larger than late goals; (ii) subjects who set early goals work more than those who only set a late goal if they explicitly revise their goal and are reminded about their revised goal. A secondary contribution of our paper is that our design addresses a treatment migration problem present in earlier studies on goals that stems from the fact that subjects in a ‘no goals’ control condition may privately set goals.

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目标修正会破坏通过目标进行的自我调节吗？一项实验

考虑到个人原则上可以很容易地修改这些目标，我们对在任务前设定的非约束性目标是否是有效的激励因素进行了新颖的测试。在我们的设置中，受试者要么在在线任务开始前几天设定目标（早期目标），要么在任务开始时设定目标（晚期目标）。还有两种处理方法允许对早期目标进行（意料之外的）明确修订。我们观察到：(i) 早期目标比晚期目标更大；(ii) 如果受试者明确修改目标并被提醒修改后的目标，那么设定早期目标的受试者比只设定晚期目标的受试者工作得更多。我们论文的另一个贡献是，我们的设计解决了早期目标研究中存在的处理迁移问题，该问题源于 "无目标 "对照条件下的受试者可能会私下设定目标这一事实。

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来源期刊

Experimental Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

4.10

自引率

8.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Experimental methods are uniquely suited to the study of many phenomena that have been difficult to observe directly in naturally occurring economic contexts. For example, the ability to induce preferences and control information structures makes it possible to isolate the effects of alternate economic structures, policies, and market institutions.Experimental Economics is an international journal that serves the growing group of economists around the world who use experimental methods. The journal invites high-quality papers in any area of experimental research in economics and related fields (i.e. accounting, finance, political science, and the psychology of decision making). State-of-the-art theoretical work and econometric work that is motivated by experimental data is also encouraged. The journal will also consider articles with a primary focus on methodology or replication of controversial findings. We welcome experiments conducted in either the laboratory or in the field. The relevant data can be decisions or non-choice data such as physiological measurements. However, we only consider studies that do not employ deception of participants and in which participants are incentivized. Experimental Economics is structured to promote experimental economics by bringing together innovative research that meets professional standards of experimental method, but without editorial bias towards specific orientations. All papers will be reviewed through the standard, anonymous-referee procedure and all accepted manuscripts will be subject to the approval of two editors. Authors must submit the instructions that participants in their study received at the time of submission of their manuscript. Authors are expected to submit separate data appendices which will be attached to the journal''s web page upon publication. Officially cited as: Exp Econ

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