{"title":"Iterated Admissibility does not refine Extensive-Form Rationalizability","authors":"Emiliano Catonini","doi":"10.1093/ej/ueae032","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I show that, in an extensive-form game, the outcomes that are consistent with Iterated Admissibility (i.e., with the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) need not be consistent with Extensive-form Rationalizability.","PeriodicalId":501319,"journal":{"name":"The Economic Journal","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Economic Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueae032","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
I show that, in an extensive-form game, the outcomes that are consistent with Iterated Admissibility (i.e., with the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) need not be consistent with Extensive-form Rationalizability.
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