{"title":"Courts-First Federalism: How Model Legislation Becomes Impact Litigation","authors":"Dylan L. Yingling, Daniel J. Mallinson","doi":"10.1017/s1537592724000616","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"States and interest groups are facilitating a redistribution of government powers under a new courts-first federalism. States are working to claw back powers while interest groups drafting model laws strategically tailor them to skirt the limits of federal law and, once adopted by states, prompt federal courts to review them as parties litigate to clarify their rights. States do not need to be completely successful in litigation to shift the balance of state–national power. Testing this argument, we find that the US Supreme Court grants review to 17% of model laws in our sample produced by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), whereas merely 1% of other cases are granted certiorari. Ultimately, the states and ALEC were partly successful in constraining federal power. Thus, the combination of model legislation, impact litigation, and courts-first federalism becomes a tool for states to draw power to themselves and from the federal government.","PeriodicalId":48097,"journal":{"name":"Perspectives on Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Perspectives on Politics","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592724000616","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
States and interest groups are facilitating a redistribution of government powers under a new courts-first federalism. States are working to claw back powers while interest groups drafting model laws strategically tailor them to skirt the limits of federal law and, once adopted by states, prompt federal courts to review them as parties litigate to clarify their rights. States do not need to be completely successful in litigation to shift the balance of state–national power. Testing this argument, we find that the US Supreme Court grants review to 17% of model laws in our sample produced by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), whereas merely 1% of other cases are granted certiorari. Ultimately, the states and ALEC were partly successful in constraining federal power. Thus, the combination of model legislation, impact litigation, and courts-first federalism becomes a tool for states to draw power to themselves and from the federal government.
期刊介绍:
Perspectives on Politics is a journal of broad interest to scholars across many fields, in addition to professional political scientists, political analysts, policy makers, and the informed public. Essays synthesize and extend significant research and developments in all dimensions of political science scholarship. In many cases, the journal aims to connect research findings, conceptual innovations, or theoretical developments to real problems of politics.