The Behavioral Strategies of Multiple Stakeholders in the NIMBY Facility Public-Private Partnership Project: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Prospect Theory

Abstract

In this study, evolutionary game method, prospect theory, and system dynamics (SD) method are combined to analyze the key stakeholders’ behaviors in the public-private partnership (PPP) project of not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) facility. First, the interaction behavior of the public sector, the private sector, and the public and their equilibrium state was analyzed based on the evolutionary game method and prospect theory. Then, the SD method was used to simulate and analyze the impact of different variables on the behavior of the three stakeholders. The results show that the greater the perceived cost difference between the active and negative behavior among the three stakeholders, the more likely they are to take negative behavior. The private sector tends to act opportunistically under low-risk loss situations. Dynamic rewards are more likely to incentivize the public to supervise than high rewards. Some recommendations to promote active behavioral interactions and cooperation among stakeholders were presented accordingly.