{"title":"Epiphenomenalism and the Evolutionary Role of Pleasure and Pain","authors":"John Wright","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.3.196","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One possible challenge for epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution: if the mental has no causal powers, how might it have evolved? The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to some arguments advanced by other philosophers, most particularly William Robinson and Joseph\n Corabi, considerations from the theory of evolution do pose a genuine difficulty for epiphenomenalism.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.196","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
One possible challenge for epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution: if the mental has no causal powers, how might it have evolved? The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to some arguments advanced by other philosophers, most particularly William Robinson and Joseph
Corabi, considerations from the theory of evolution do pose a genuine difficulty for epiphenomenalism.