Constrained heterogeneous two-facility location games with sum-variant

Abstract

We study deterministic mechanism design for constrained heterogeneous two-facility location games. The constraint here means that the feasible locations of facilities are specified and the number of facilities that can be built at each feasible location is limited. Given that a set of agents can strategically report their locations on the real line, the authority wants to design strategyproof mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms that can incentivize agents to report truthful private information) to construct two heterogeneous facilities under constraint, while optimizing the corresponding social objectives. Assuming that each agent’s individual objective depends on the sum of her distance to facilities, we consider locating desirable and obnoxious facilities respectively. For the former, we give a deterministic group strategyproof mechanism, which guarantees 3-approximation under the objectives of minimizing the sum cost and the maximum cost. We show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can have an approximation ratio of less than 2 under the sum/maximum cost objective. For the latter, we give a deterministic group strategyproof mechanism with 2-approximation under the objectives of maximizing the sum utility and the minimum utility. We show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can have an approximation ratio of less than 3/2 under the sum utility objective and 2 under the minimum utility objective, respectively.