Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard, Magdaléna Tydrichová
{"title":"Euclidean preferences in the plane under $$\\varvec{\\ell _1},$$ $$\\varvec{\\ell _2}$$ and $$\\varvec{\\ell _\\infty }$$ norms","authors":"Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard, Magdaléna Tydrichová","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01525-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We present various results about Euclidean preferences in the plane under <span>\\(\\ell _1,\\)</span> <span>\\(\\ell _2\\)</span> and <span>\\(\\ell _{\\infty }\\)</span> norms. When there are four candidates, we show that the maximum size (in terms of the number of pairwise distinct preferences) of Euclidean preference profiles in <span>\\({\\mathbb {R}}^2\\)</span> under norm <span>\\(\\ell _1\\)</span> or <span>\\(\\ell _{\\infty }\\)</span> is 19. Whatever the number of candidates, we prove that at most four distinct candidates can be ranked in the last position of a two-dimensional Euclidean preference profile under norm <span>\\(\\ell _1\\)</span> or <span>\\(\\ell _\\infty ,\\)</span> which generalizes the case of one-dimensional Euclidean preferences (for which it is well known that at most two candidates can be ranked last). We generalize this result to <span>\\(2^d\\)</span> (resp. 2<i>d</i>) for <span>\\(\\ell _1\\)</span> (resp. <span>\\(\\ell _\\infty \\)</span>) for <i>d</i>-dimensional Euclidean preferences. We also establish that the maximum size of a two-dimensional Euclidean preference profile on <i>m</i> candidates under norm <span>\\(\\ell _1\\)</span> is in <span>\\(\\varTheta (m^4),\\)</span> which is the same order of magnitude as the known maximum size under norm <span>\\(\\ell _2.\\)</span> Finally, we provide a new proof that two-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles under norm <span>\\(\\ell _2\\)</span> for four candidates can be characterized by three inclusion-maximal two-dimensional Euclidean profiles. This proof is a simpler alternative to that proposed by Kamiya et al. (Adv Appl Math 47(2):379–400, 2011).</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social Choice and Welfare","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01525-2","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We present various results about Euclidean preferences in the plane under \(\ell _1,\)\(\ell _2\) and \(\ell _{\infty }\) norms. When there are four candidates, we show that the maximum size (in terms of the number of pairwise distinct preferences) of Euclidean preference profiles in \({\mathbb {R}}^2\) under norm \(\ell _1\) or \(\ell _{\infty }\) is 19. Whatever the number of candidates, we prove that at most four distinct candidates can be ranked in the last position of a two-dimensional Euclidean preference profile under norm \(\ell _1\) or \(\ell _\infty ,\) which generalizes the case of one-dimensional Euclidean preferences (for which it is well known that at most two candidates can be ranked last). We generalize this result to \(2^d\) (resp. 2d) for \(\ell _1\) (resp. \(\ell _\infty \)) for d-dimensional Euclidean preferences. We also establish that the maximum size of a two-dimensional Euclidean preference profile on m candidates under norm \(\ell _1\) is in \(\varTheta (m^4),\) which is the same order of magnitude as the known maximum size under norm \(\ell _2.\) Finally, we provide a new proof that two-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles under norm \(\ell _2\) for four candidates can be characterized by three inclusion-maximal two-dimensional Euclidean profiles. This proof is a simpler alternative to that proposed by Kamiya et al. (Adv Appl Math 47(2):379–400, 2011).
期刊介绍:
Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf