Euclidean preferences in the plane under $$\varvec{\ell _1},$$ $$\varvec{\ell _2}$$ and $$\varvec{\ell _\infty }$$ norms

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI:10.1007/s00355-024-01525-2
Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard, Magdaléna Tydrichová
{"title":"Euclidean preferences in the plane under $$\\varvec{\\ell _1},$$ $$\\varvec{\\ell _2}$$ and $$\\varvec{\\ell _\\infty }$$ norms","authors":"Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard, Magdaléna Tydrichová","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01525-2","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We present various results about Euclidean preferences in the plane under <span>\\(\\ell _1,\\)</span> <span>\\(\\ell _2\\)</span> and <span>\\(\\ell _{\\infty }\\)</span> norms. When there are four candidates, we show that the maximum size (in terms of the number of pairwise distinct preferences) of Euclidean preference profiles in <span>\\({\\mathbb {R}}^2\\)</span> under norm <span>\\(\\ell _1\\)</span> or <span>\\(\\ell _{\\infty }\\)</span> is 19. Whatever the number of candidates, we prove that at most four distinct candidates can be ranked in the last position of a two-dimensional Euclidean preference profile under norm <span>\\(\\ell _1\\)</span> or <span>\\(\\ell _\\infty ,\\)</span> which generalizes the case of one-dimensional Euclidean preferences (for which it is well known that at most two candidates can be ranked last). We generalize this result to <span>\\(2^d\\)</span> (resp. 2<i>d</i>) for <span>\\(\\ell _1\\)</span> (resp. <span>\\(\\ell _\\infty \\)</span>) for <i>d</i>-dimensional Euclidean preferences. We also establish that the maximum size of a two-dimensional Euclidean preference profile on <i>m</i> candidates under norm <span>\\(\\ell _1\\)</span> is in <span>\\(\\varTheta (m^4),\\)</span> which is the same order of magnitude as the known maximum size under norm <span>\\(\\ell _2.\\)</span> Finally, we provide a new proof that two-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles under norm <span>\\(\\ell _2\\)</span> for four candidates can be characterized by three inclusion-maximal two-dimensional Euclidean profiles. This proof is a simpler alternative to that proposed by Kamiya et al. (Adv Appl Math 47(2):379–400, 2011).</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social Choice and Welfare","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01525-2","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

We present various results about Euclidean preferences in the plane under \(\ell _1,\) \(\ell _2\) and \(\ell _{\infty }\) norms. When there are four candidates, we show that the maximum size (in terms of the number of pairwise distinct preferences) of Euclidean preference profiles in \({\mathbb {R}}^2\) under norm \(\ell _1\) or \(\ell _{\infty }\) is 19. Whatever the number of candidates, we prove that at most four distinct candidates can be ranked in the last position of a two-dimensional Euclidean preference profile under norm \(\ell _1\) or \(\ell _\infty ,\) which generalizes the case of one-dimensional Euclidean preferences (for which it is well known that at most two candidates can be ranked last). We generalize this result to \(2^d\) (resp. 2d) for \(\ell _1\) (resp. \(\ell _\infty \)) for d-dimensional Euclidean preferences. We also establish that the maximum size of a two-dimensional Euclidean preference profile on m candidates under norm \(\ell _1\) is in \(\varTheta (m^4),\) which is the same order of magnitude as the known maximum size under norm \(\ell _2.\) Finally, we provide a new proof that two-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles under norm \(\ell _2\) for four candidates can be characterized by three inclusion-maximal two-dimensional Euclidean profiles. This proof is a simpler alternative to that proposed by Kamiya et al. (Adv Appl Math 47(2):379–400, 2011).

查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
在$$\varvec{\ell _1}、$$\varvec{\ell _2}$$和$$\varvec{\ell _\infty}$规范下的平面欧氏优选法
我们提出了在(ell _1,\)\(ell _2\)和(ell _{\infty }\)规范下平面中欧氏偏好的各种结果。当有四个候选人时,我们证明在规范(\ell _1)或(\ell _{\infty }\ )下,欧几里得偏好剖面的最大大小(以成对的不同偏好的数量为单位)是19。无论候选人的数量是多少,我们证明在规范(\ell _1)或(\ell _{infty ,\)下,最多有四个不同的候选人可以排在二维欧几里得偏好轮廓的最后一位,这概括了一维欧几里得偏好的情况(对于一维欧几里得偏好,众所周知最多有两个候选人可以排在最后一位)。我们将这一结果推广到d维欧几里得偏好的\(\ell _1\) (respect.我们还证明,在规范(\ell _1)下,关于 m 个候选人的二维欧几里得偏好轮廓的最大尺寸是 \(\varTheta (m^4),\) ,这与已知的规范(\ell _2.\)下的最大尺寸是同一个数量级。 最后,我们提供了一个新的证明,即在规范(\ell _2)下,四个候选人的二维欧几里得偏好轮廓可以用三个包含最大的二维欧几里得轮廓来描述。这个证明比 Kamiya 等人提出的证明更简单(Adv Appl Math 47(2):379-400, 2011)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
期刊最新文献
Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information Flexible representative democracy An axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives Natural interviewing equilibria in matching settings
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1