Categoricity Problem for LP and K3

Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI:10.1007/s11225-024-10098-1
Selcuk Kaan Tabakci
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Abstract

Even though the strong relationship between proof-theoretic and model-theoretic notions in one’s logical theory can be shown by soundness and completeness proofs, whether we can define the model-theoretic notions by means of the inferences in a proof system is not at all trivial. For instance, provable inferences in a proof system of classical logic in the logical framework SET-FMLA do not determine its intended models as shown by Carnap (Formalization of logic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1943), i.e., there are non-Boolean models that satisfy its provable inferences. In the literature, this is known as the Categoricity problem or Carnap’s problem. In this paper, we will discuss the Categoricity problem (or Carnap’s problem) for three-valued logics K3 and LP. We will provide three different restrictions on admissible models that will deliver us categoricity results, some of which draw from the solutions provided for the Categoricity problem for classical logic in Belnap and Massey (Stud Log 49(1):67–82, 1990) and Bonnay and Westerståhl (Erkenntis 81(4):721–739, 2016). We will then argue that two of those solutions are philosophically well-motivated: (1) restricting the admissible models where negation is interpreted as a Strong Kleene truth-function, and (2) restricting the admissible models where a complex formula is assigned the third value when its immediate subformulas are assigned the third value.

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LP 和 K3 的分类问题
尽管逻辑理论中的证明论概念与模型论概念之间的紧密关系可以通过完备性和完备性证明来证明,但我们是否可以通过证明系统中的推论来定义模型论概念却并非易事。例如,在 SET-FMLA 的逻辑框架中,经典逻辑证明系统中的可证推论并不像卡尔纳普(《逻辑的形式化》,哈佛大学出版社,剑桥,1943 年)所证明的那样决定其预期模型,即存在满足其可证推论的非布尔模型。在文献中,这被称为分类问题或卡尔纳普问题。本文将讨论三值逻辑 K3 和 LP 的分类性问题(或卡纳普问题)。我们将对可接受模型提供三种不同的限制,这些限制将为我们提供分类结果,其中一些限制借鉴了贝尔纳普和梅西(Stud Log 49(1):67-82, 1990)以及博奈和韦斯特斯托尔(Erkenntis 81(4):721-739, 2016)中为经典逻辑的分类问题提供的解决方案。然后,我们将论证其中两个解决方案在哲学上是有充分动机的:(1)限制否定被解释为强克莱因真函数的可容许模型,以及(2)限制复式在其直接子公式被赋予第三值时被赋予第三值的可容许模型。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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