Foreign Aid, Violence, and Electoral Support in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence From the Philippines

Abstract

Election-related violence is rampant in many developing countries that receive foreign aid. However, it is not well understood why voters often elect representatives who are associated with such violence. In this article, I investigate why voters might support politicians who resort to violence. I argue that the poor tend to vote for candidates who deliver tangible local benefits through foreign aid projects even when those candidates use violence during election periods. To support this argument, I conducted a nationwide survey in the Philippines that included an experiment about the effects of foreign aid and violence on voters’ electoral support for a candidate. I find that poor voters who reside in a region where basic public goods and services are deficient are more likely to support a candidate whose district has received foreign aid, regardless of her alleged electoral violence. This research sheds light on a mechanism that links poverty to electoral violence in less developed countries. It also reveals an unintended consequence of foreign aid: increasing the likelihood of electoral violence.