Informal board hierarchy and corporate ESG performance

Abstract

Against the backdrop of driving global economic sustainability, corporate Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance has gradually emerged as a crucial theoretical and practical concern. This study aims to enrich the theoretical understanding of the correlation between corporate governance and ESG. Notably, the theoretical contribution is based on the relational contract theory, indicating the significance of the informal structure and implicit characteristics of the board of directors for corporate ESG performance. Using Chinese listed firms as samples, this study empirically examines and reveals a positive correlation between the informal board hierarchy and corporate ESG performance. Moreover, based on theoretical deduction, this study identifies internal control, innovation efficiency, and financial performance as important mechanisms through which the informal board hierarchy promotes corporate ESG performance. Further analysis indicates that in firms characterized by higher board interaction, lower shareholding concentration, and the combination of the roles of chairman and CEO, the promoting effect of the informal hierarchy on corporate ESG becomes significantly more pronounced. Our findings contribute to the understanding of relational contract theory in the field of corporate sustainability, enriching the literature on corporate governance and ESG, and providing decision-making references and practical insights for optimizing corporate development.