What does it mean to be good? The normative and metaethical problem with ‘AI for good’

Abstract

Using AI for good is an imperative for its development and regulation, but what exactly does it mean? This article contends that ‘AI for good’ is a powerful normative concept and is problematic for the ethics of AI because it oversimplifies complex philosophical questions in defining good and assumes a level of moral knowledge and certainty that may not be justified. ‘AI for good’ expresses a value judgement on what AI should be and its role in society, thereby functioning as a normative concept in AI ethics. As a moral statement, AI for good makes two things implicit: i) we know what a good outcome is and ii) we know the process by which to achieve it. By examining these two claims, this article will articulate the thesis that ‘AI for good’ should be examined as a normative and metaethical problem for AI ethics. Furthermore, it argues that we need to pay more attention to our relationship with normativity and how it guides what we believe the ‘work’ of ethical AI should be.