Campaign-style law enforcement in China: Causes and consequences

Abstract

This article aims to address two primary research questions: first, why does the Chinese government consistently favour campaign-style law enforcement, and second, what are the consequences of this law enforcement approach for China's criminal justice system? Drawing on a review of the existing literature and official documents on anti-crime campaigns, as well as interview data concerning local policing problems, this article offers both top-down and bottom-up explanations regarding the government's persistent employment of campaign-style law enforcement to tackle serious and organised crime. The top-down approach perceives China's anti-crime campaigns as elite-engineered moral panics and the result of political elites’ long-standing tendency towards “heavy penaltyism.” The bottom-up approach focuses on the failure of routine law enforcement and collusion between local officials and gangsters, which necessitates anti-crime campaigns. To illustrate the consequences of campaign-style law enforcement on the criminal justice system, this article explores empirical data collected during China's latest “Sweep Away Black Societies and Eliminate Evil Forces” campaign and highlights the costs of campaign-style law enforcement, such as eroding the rule of law, generating a criminal justice pendulum and creating serious procedural injustices.