More Electoral Competition Without More Voter Participation: Quasi-Experimental Test of a Term Limit Reform in Ecuador

Abstract

Term limits are theoretically expected to boost voter participation which has been confirmed by multiple empirical examinations. This study uses a robust causal assessment within the difference-in-differences framework to evaluate this hypothesis. It leverages an exogenous 2018 term limit reform in Ecuador which prohibited some, but not all, incumbent mayors from running in elections. Contrary to expectations, the results indicate null findings: the adoption of term limits has neither increased turnout, nor depressed the casting of blank and spoiled ballots (alternative indicators of voter engagement under compulsory voting). This is puzzling given that the reform impacted the electoral competition by significantly increasing the number of mayoral candidates in the newly open-seat contests. Two possible solutions to the puzzle of the null findings are presented with implications for understanding the scope conditions for the effect of term limits on voter participation.