Children use proximity and ability to infer distinct kinds of counterfactual closeness.

Abstract

Counterfactual outcomes (i.e., events that did not happen) vary in their closeness to reality. Whereas some are viewed as distant possibilities, others are seen as close, barely unrealized outcomes. Here, we investigate whether young children distinguish between two kinds of counterfactual closeness: one based on proximity and the other on ability. In two experiments, 4-7-year-olds (total N = 304) saw stories where two agents lost a race against a competitor. One of the losing racers finished just behind the winner (proximity), whereas the other losing racer was much faster than the winner (ability) but lost after tripping on a stone. When asked which racer almost won the race, children across the full age range predominantly picked the racer who finished in second place, close behind the winner. However, when asked which racer easily could have won and when asked which racer should have won, children at older ages picked the fastest racer. Together, these findings show that children's understanding of proximity-based closeness is already present at Age 4, earlier than children were previously thought to grasp counterfactual closeness. Moreover, the findings suggest young children have differentiated concepts of counterfactual closeness and do not conflate the two kinds of closeness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).