The impact of institutions, industry, and scale of operations on foreign subsidiaries’ political connections: evidence from Saudi Arabia and Egypt

Abstract

Purpose

Research on the political connections of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs’) subsidiaries in emerging host countries has been growing. The purpose of this paper is to integrate institutional and resource dependence theories to argue that MNEs-subsidiaries are likely to develop fewer formal (i.e. board-level) political connections when operating in welfare-state monarchies as compared to in host countries with developmental-state democratic systems. Furthermore, this paper argues that MNE-subsidiaries develop formal political connections to a greater extent in industries where religion influences the development of products and services considerably. Finally, the extent of developing formal political connections varies by the scale of the MNEs’ investment (or subsidiary density) in the host market.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper tests its hypotheses on a sample of foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The data was collected by combining information from Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database with company websites and other secondary sources. The final sample consisted of 156 observations – 70 MNEs-subsidiaries operating in Saudi Arabia, and 86 in Egypt.

Findings

The findings confirm that foreign subsidiaries are likely to develop fewer formal political connections in a welfare-state monarchy as compared to in a developmental-state democratic system. Furthermore, formal political connections are more significant in industries that are impacted by the influence of religion – such as the financial industry in Arab countries. Finally, the extent of using political connections varies by the scale of the MNEs’ investment in the host market – that is, with a greater scale of investment (or higher subsidiary density), formal political connections are greater.

Originality/value

The paper contributes theoretically by explaining that a combination of institutional heterogeneity and its associated resource dependence conditions between MNEs and host governments influence MNE-subsidiaries' political connections. The paper tests its hypotheses in an emerging Arab context, which is characterized by both autocratic and semi-democratic political settings, and which makes the integration of institutional and resource dependence theories useful in explaining how MNE-subsidiaries navigate local complexities in this region.