{"title":"Partitionable choice functions and stability","authors":"Umut Dur, Thayer Morrill, William Phan","doi":"10.1007/s00355-024-01534-1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We consider the two-sided many-to-one matching problem and introduce a class of preferences reflecting natural forms of complementarities. For example, academic departments hire seniors and then supporting juniors, teams recruit different roles and specialties, starting with the critical ones, and firms hire workers at various levels, starting with the executives. The key feature is that a firm can partition workers into types and prioritize certain types before others. Despite this partitionability requirement of choice functions being weaker than substitutes—an essential condition concerning the existence of a stable assignment—we show that it still guarantees the existence of a stable assignment and is further a maximal domain for such.</p>","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social Choice and Welfare","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01534-1","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We consider the two-sided many-to-one matching problem and introduce a class of preferences reflecting natural forms of complementarities. For example, academic departments hire seniors and then supporting juniors, teams recruit different roles and specialties, starting with the critical ones, and firms hire workers at various levels, starting with the executives. The key feature is that a firm can partition workers into types and prioritize certain types before others. Despite this partitionability requirement of choice functions being weaker than substitutes—an essential condition concerning the existence of a stable assignment—we show that it still guarantees the existence of a stable assignment and is further a maximal domain for such.
期刊介绍：
Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
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