The case for agency: Three dimensions of discretion in presidential agenda construction

Abstract

When scholars address presidential agenda setting, they focus on how presidents go about getting what they want. We know far less about the prior step: how presidents decide what they want (agenda construction). Moreover, prior work that has dealt with this topic has focused on the external constraints imposed on presidential choice by Congress and public opinion. I contend, by contrast, that presidents have considerable agency in determining their domestic policy priorities. They rely on it to establish who they are and where they want to take the nation, putting forward their own “political projects.” I situate this agency in the selection of agenda items and the manner and sequence in which presidents pursue them. Failing to account for this “power of initiative and origination” leaves us with an underspecified understanding of presidential decision making that obscures the consequentiality of leadership in driving important policy outcomes. I develop this argument by exploring three presidential administrations that pose a hard test for my agency thesis: Richard Nixon, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush. These case studies draw from archival records obtained at the associated presidential libraries and interviews with senior administration personnel.