{"title":"Employee ownership and corporate investment efficiency in Europe","authors":"Sami Adwan, M. Mostak Ahamed","doi":"10.1007/s11156-024-01300-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate the effect of non-executive employee ownership (EO) on the efficiency of investment decisions for a sample of non-financial European firms over the period 2006–2017. We find a positive (negative) association between EO and investment for firms that are more likely to underinvest (overinvest). In addition, we find the impact of EO on underinvestment and overinvestment to be more pronounced for firms with lower analyst following and lower blockholding ownership. Overall, our findings suggest that employee ownership increases firm-level investment efficiency through two channels: reduced information asymmetry and improved monitoring of management. The results hold after using an alternative specification of investment efficiency, Heckman's two-stage procedure, instrumental variable regressions, and alternative proxies for information asymmetry and monitoring of management both at the firm and the country level.</p>","PeriodicalId":47688,"journal":{"name":"Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-024-01300-5","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We investigate the effect of non-executive employee ownership (EO) on the efficiency of investment decisions for a sample of non-financial European firms over the period 2006–2017. We find a positive (negative) association between EO and investment for firms that are more likely to underinvest (overinvest). In addition, we find the impact of EO on underinvestment and overinvestment to be more pronounced for firms with lower analyst following and lower blockholding ownership. Overall, our findings suggest that employee ownership increases firm-level investment efficiency through two channels: reduced information asymmetry and improved monitoring of management. The results hold after using an alternative specification of investment efficiency, Heckman's two-stage procedure, instrumental variable regressions, and alternative proxies for information asymmetry and monitoring of management both at the firm and the country level.
期刊介绍：
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting deals with research involving the interaction of finance with accounting, economics, and quantitative methods, focused on finance and accounting. The papers published present useful theoretical and methodological results with the support of interesting empirical applications. Purely theoretical and methodological research with the potential for important applications is also published. Besides the traditional high-quality theoretical and empirical research in finance, the journal also publishes papers dealing with interdisciplinary topics.
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