{"title":"The Effect of Takeover Protection in Quiet Life and Bonding Firms","authors":"Eliezer M. Fich, Jarrad Harford, Adam S. Yore","doi":"10.1017/s0022109023001473","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Antitakeover measures are controversial because the evidence of their net effect on shareholders is mixed. We propose that, for many firms, the potential bonding benefits outweigh the agency costs of the quiet life, explaining the mixed results. We study business combination and poison pill laws as exogenous shocks to takeover vulnerability and use shareholder valuation of internal slack as an indicator of the net effect of takeover protection. Firms susceptible to quiet life agency problems exhibit a decrease in the market-assessed value of internal slack. Conversely, cash appreciates at companies where takeover protection bonds commitments with major counterparties.</p>","PeriodicalId":48380,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109023001473","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
Antitakeover measures are controversial because the evidence of their net effect on shareholders is mixed. We propose that, for many firms, the potential bonding benefits outweigh the agency costs of the quiet life, explaining the mixed results. We study business combination and poison pill laws as exogenous shocks to takeover vulnerability and use shareholder valuation of internal slack as an indicator of the net effect of takeover protection. Firms susceptible to quiet life agency problems exhibit a decrease in the market-assessed value of internal slack. Conversely, cash appreciates at companies where takeover protection bonds commitments with major counterparties.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA) publishes theoretical and empirical research in financial economics. Topics include corporate finance, investments, capital and security markets, and quantitative methods of particular relevance to financial researchers. With a circulation of 3000 libraries, firms, and individuals in 70 nations, the JFQA serves an international community of sophisticated finance scholars—academics and practitioners alike. The JFQA prints less than 10% of the more than 600 unsolicited manuscripts submitted annually. An intensive blind review process and exacting editorial standards contribute to the JFQA’s reputation as a top finance journal.
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