Phenomenology and making sense of the DSM: situatedness in melancholic and atypical depression

IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-07-26 DOI:10.1007/s11097-024-10014-x
Aryan Kavosh
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Abstract

In light of the recent calls for integrating phenomenology and psychiatry, I will address the problem of heterogeneity in major depressive disorder (MDD) using the phenomenological account of depression put forth by Fernandez (Fernandez, 2014). I will first go over the distinction between two of the major specifiers of major depressive disorder, namely melancholic and atypical depression. Then, I review the account of depression developed by Fernandez, which considers some of the people diagnosed with MDD to have an erosion of the capacity for the category of moods as opposed to a particular kind of mood. I will apply this conception to the diagnostic and statistical manual criteria for melancholic and atypical depression, and consider how reactive and unreactive depressed moods can be clarified using this conception. I argue that we can help our understanding of MDD by viewing melancholic depression as primarily characterized by structural erosion of the person’s situatedness (observed as a lack of mood reactivity) and atypical depression as a state in which the capacity for moods in general has not been eroded (hence, the retention of mood reactivity), with the psychopathology rooted only in the content of experience (the moods themselves). I discuss how this conception related to other phenomenological accounts of depression and why it can be useful in making sense of some clinical observations between the two specifiers, namely the differences in illness severity and symptoms of depersonalization and derealization, before concluding the work by considering its relationship with the operationalized approach of the DSM.

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DSM 的现象学和意义:忧郁症和非典型抑郁症的情景性
鉴于近来将现象学与精神病学相结合的呼声,我将利用费尔南德斯(Fernandez,2014)提出的抑郁症现象学观点来探讨重度抑郁障碍(MDD)的异质性问题。首先,我将介绍重度抑郁障碍的两个主要特征之间的区别,即忧郁型抑郁和非典型抑郁。然后,我将回顾费尔南德斯对抑郁症的论述,他认为一些被诊断为重度抑郁症的人的情绪能力受到了侵蚀,而不是某种特定的情绪。我将把这一概念应用于《诊断与统计手册》中关于忧郁症和非典型抑郁症的标准,并考虑如何利用这一概念来澄清反应性抑郁情绪和非反应性抑郁情绪。我认为,我们可以将忧郁型抑郁症视为以人的情境性结构性侵蚀为主要特征(观察到的是情绪反应性的缺乏),而将非典型抑郁症视为情绪能力总体上未受到侵蚀的一种状态(因此,情绪反应性得以保留),其精神病理学仅植根于体验的内容(情绪本身),从而有助于我们对 MDD 的理解。我将讨论这一概念与抑郁症的其他现象学描述之间的关系,以及为什么它有助于理解这两种类型之间的一些临床观察结果,即疾病严重程度以及人格解体和去人格化症状之间的差异,最后考虑其与 DSM 的操作化方法之间的关系。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
8.70%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems.    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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