Pablo Valdivieso-Kastner, Sergio Huertas-Hernández
{"title":"When Congress Prevails: Veto Overrides and Legislative Fragmentation in Multiparty Legislatures","authors":"Pablo Valdivieso-Kastner, Sergio Huertas-Hernández","doi":"10.1177/10659129241268822","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study delves into the determinants of legislative overrides in multiparty legislatures, with a specific focus on the influence of partisan fragmentation within congress. Utilizing an original dataset spanning from 1995 to 2017, we examine the cases of Ecuador and Peru. Our argument posits that during lawmaking, a dispersed and fragmented party system prevents the president from anticipating the preferences of the congressional pivotal party. In such a scenario of incomplete information, the president’s capacity to introduce selective incentives through vetoes is limited. In this way, the president is less likely to break the congressional majority supporting a bill. Consequently, the vetoed bill becomes less acceptable compared to the original statute. This, in turn, provides the congressional majority with increased incentives to uphold the original bill, elevating the likelihood of a legislative override. In alignment with this rationale, our findings indicate that an increase in the effective number of parties (ENP) has a positive and significant impact on the probability of a legislative override. Additionally, our evidence underscores a noteworthy contrast between the relatively high rate of legislative overrides in Latin America and findings for the US case.","PeriodicalId":51366,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Research Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241268822","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study delves into the determinants of legislative overrides in multiparty legislatures, with a specific focus on the influence of partisan fragmentation within congress. Utilizing an original dataset spanning from 1995 to 2017, we examine the cases of Ecuador and Peru. Our argument posits that during lawmaking, a dispersed and fragmented party system prevents the president from anticipating the preferences of the congressional pivotal party. In such a scenario of incomplete information, the president’s capacity to introduce selective incentives through vetoes is limited. In this way, the president is less likely to break the congressional majority supporting a bill. Consequently, the vetoed bill becomes less acceptable compared to the original statute. This, in turn, provides the congressional majority with increased incentives to uphold the original bill, elevating the likelihood of a legislative override. In alignment with this rationale, our findings indicate that an increase in the effective number of parties (ENP) has a positive and significant impact on the probability of a legislative override. Additionally, our evidence underscores a noteworthy contrast between the relatively high rate of legislative overrides in Latin America and findings for the US case.
期刊介绍:
Political Research Quarterly (PRQ) is the official journal of the Western Political Science Association. PRQ seeks to publish scholarly research of exceptionally high merit that makes notable contributions in any subfield of political science. The editors especially encourage submissions that employ a mixture of theoretical approaches or multiple methodologies to address major political problems or puzzles at a local, national, or global level. Collections of articles on a common theme or debate, to be published as short symposia, are welcome as well as individual submissions.