Mayors Unchecked: Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of Local Autonomy in Latin American Municipalities

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that, relative to chief executives at higher levels of government, mayors in Latin America often operate with fewer outside checks on their scope of action, with problematic consequences for democracy. To make this argument, we examine a number of factors that can render mayors especially powerful and autonomous as political actors, and distinguish between the vertical (inter-governmental) and horizontal (inter-branch) dimensions of their autonomy. Vertically, we show that mayors have more institutional leeway than governors given the absence of the mechanism of interventions from the national government that could check their power. Horizontally, we identify a number of institutional and noninstitutional advantages that can enable mayors to exercise predominance vis-à-vis municipal legislative bodies and other actors in the local political landscape. To support our argument, we provide evidence gathered from fieldwork in six municipalities in three different countries (Chile, Paraguay, and Peru).