A tripartite evolutionary game study on the governance of online catering riders’ traffic violations from the perspective of collaborative regulation

Abstract

In the online catering industry, delivery riders’ traffic violations significantly threaten public transportation safety, inadequately addressed by current regulations from the government and online platforms. This paper proposes a government-led collaborative regulatory mechanism with active platform participation. A tripartite evolutionary game model, including the government, platforms, and riders, evaluates this approach. Findings suggest that collaborative regulation forms when the combined start-up and subsidy costs of government-led regulation are less than the total benefits of collaboration and when the cost difference between active and passive platform participation is less than the total benefit of active participation. Effective regulation occurs when combined penalties for riders’ violations exceed the profit difference between illegal and compliant deliveries. Reducing government regulation start-up costs and increasing penalties and enforcement probabilities can promote compliance among riders. Excessive subsidies to platforms do not effectively control violations, indicating the need for balanced subsidy allocation for optimal regulatory effectiveness.