Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender

IF 0.5 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.07.002
Anuj S. Vora , Ankur A. Kulkarni
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study a setting where a receiver must design a questionnaire to recover a sequence of symbols known to a strategic sender, whose utility may not be incentive compatible. We allow the receiver the possibility of selecting the alternatives presented in the questionnaire, and thereby linking decisions across the components of the sequence. We show that, despite the strategic sender and the noise in the channel, the receiver can recover exponentially many sequences, but also that exponentially many sequences are unrecoverable even by the best strategy. We define the growth rate of the number of recovered sequences as the information extraction capacity. A generalization of the Shannon capacity, it characterizes the optimal amount of communication resources required while communicating with a strategic sender. We derive bounds leading to an exact evaluation of the information extraction capacity in many cases. Our results form the building blocks of a novel, non-cooperative regime of communication involving a strategic sender.

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香农遇上迈尔森从战略发送者那里提取信息
我们研究了这样一种情况:接收者必须设计一份调查问卷,以恢复策略发送者已知的符号序列,而策略发送者的效用可能与激励不兼容。我们允许接收者选择调查问卷中的备选方案,从而将序列各部分的决策联系起来。我们证明,尽管有策略发送者和信道中的噪声,接收者仍能恢复指数级数量的序列,而且指数级数量的序列即使采用最佳策略也无法恢复。我们将恢复序列数量的增长率定义为信息提取能力。作为香农容量的一般化,它描述了与策略发送者通信时所需的最佳通信资源量。我们推导出了在许多情况下精确评估信息提取能力的界限。我们的研究成果构成了一种新颖的、涉及策略发送者的非合作性通信机制的基石。
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来源期刊
Mathematical Social Sciences
Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
审稿时长
59 days
期刊介绍: The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.
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