{"title":"Rationalizing risk aversion in science: Why incentives to work hard clash with incentives to take risks.","authors":"Kevin Gross, Carl T Bergstrom","doi":"10.1371/journal.pbio.3002750","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Scientific research requires taking risks, as the most cautious approaches are unlikely to lead to the most rapid progress. Yet, much funded scientific research plays it safe and funding agencies bemoan the difficulty of attracting high-risk, high-return research projects. Why don't the incentives for scientific discovery adequately impel researchers toward such projects? Here, we adapt an economic contracting model to explore how the unobservability of risk and effort discourages risky research. The model considers a hidden-action problem, in which the scientific community must reward discoveries in a way that encourages effort and risk-taking while simultaneously protecting researchers' livelihoods against the vicissitudes of scientific chance. Its challenge when doing so is that incentives to motivate effort clash with incentives to motivate risk-taking, because a failed project may be evidence of a risky undertaking but could also be the result of simple sloth. As a result, the incentives needed to encourage effort actively discourage risk-taking. Scientists respond by working on safe projects that generate evidence of effort but that don't move science forward as rapidly as riskier projects would. A social planner who prizes scientific productivity above researchers' well-being could remedy the problem by rewarding major discoveries richly enough to induce high-risk research, but in doing so would expose scientists to a degree of livelihood risk that ultimately leaves them worse off. Because the scientific community is approximately self-governing and constructs its own reward schedule, the incentives that researchers are willing to impose on themselves are inadequate to motivate the scientific risks that would best expedite scientific progress.</p>","PeriodicalId":49001,"journal":{"name":"PLoS Biology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":9.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11326573/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PLoS Biology","FirstCategoryId":"99","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3002750","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"生物学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2024/8/1 0:00:00","PubModel":"eCollection","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Agricultural and Biological Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Scientific research requires taking risks, as the most cautious approaches are unlikely to lead to the most rapid progress. Yet, much funded scientific research plays it safe and funding agencies bemoan the difficulty of attracting high-risk, high-return research projects. Why don't the incentives for scientific discovery adequately impel researchers toward such projects? Here, we adapt an economic contracting model to explore how the unobservability of risk and effort discourages risky research. The model considers a hidden-action problem, in which the scientific community must reward discoveries in a way that encourages effort and risk-taking while simultaneously protecting researchers' livelihoods against the vicissitudes of scientific chance. Its challenge when doing so is that incentives to motivate effort clash with incentives to motivate risk-taking, because a failed project may be evidence of a risky undertaking but could also be the result of simple sloth. As a result, the incentives needed to encourage effort actively discourage risk-taking. Scientists respond by working on safe projects that generate evidence of effort but that don't move science forward as rapidly as riskier projects would. A social planner who prizes scientific productivity above researchers' well-being could remedy the problem by rewarding major discoveries richly enough to induce high-risk research, but in doing so would expose scientists to a degree of livelihood risk that ultimately leaves them worse off. Because the scientific community is approximately self-governing and constructs its own reward schedule, the incentives that researchers are willing to impose on themselves are inadequate to motivate the scientific risks that would best expedite scientific progress.
期刊介绍:
PLOS Biology is the flagship journal of the Public Library of Science (PLOS) and focuses on publishing groundbreaking and relevant research in all areas of biological science. The journal features works at various scales, ranging from molecules to ecosystems, and also encourages interdisciplinary studies. PLOS Biology publishes articles that demonstrate exceptional significance, originality, and relevance, with a high standard of scientific rigor in methodology, reporting, and conclusions.
The journal aims to advance science and serve the research community by transforming research communication to align with the research process. It offers evolving article types and policies that empower authors to share the complete story behind their scientific findings with a diverse global audience of researchers, educators, policymakers, patient advocacy groups, and the general public.
PLOS Biology, along with other PLOS journals, is widely indexed by major services such as Crossref, Dimensions, DOAJ, Google Scholar, PubMed, PubMed Central, Scopus, and Web of Science. Additionally, PLOS Biology is indexed by various other services including AGRICOLA, Biological Abstracts, BIOSYS Previews, CABI CAB Abstracts, CABI Global Health, CAPES, CAS, CNKI, Embase, Journal Guide, MEDLINE, and Zoological Record, ensuring that the research content is easily accessible and discoverable by a wide range of audiences.