{"title":"Multiagent learning for competitive opinion optimization","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.tcs.2024.114787","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in social networks, the <em>opinion maximization (or minimization)</em> problem has been studied mainly for designing seeding algorithms that aim at selecting a subset of nodes to control their opinions. We first define a two-player zero-sum Stackelberg game of competitive opinion optimization by letting the player under study as the leader minimize the sum of expressed opinions by doing so-called “internal opinion design”, knowing that the other adversarial player as the follower is to maximize the same objective by also conducting her own internal opinion design. We furthermore consider multiagent learning, specifically using the Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent, and analyze its convergence to equilibria in the simultaneous-game version of competitive opinion optimization.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":49438,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Computer Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Theoretical Computer Science","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304397524004043","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in social networks, the opinion maximization (or minimization) problem has been studied mainly for designing seeding algorithms that aim at selecting a subset of nodes to control their opinions. We first define a two-player zero-sum Stackelberg game of competitive opinion optimization by letting the player under study as the leader minimize the sum of expressed opinions by doing so-called “internal opinion design”, knowing that the other adversarial player as the follower is to maximize the same objective by also conducting her own internal opinion design. We furthermore consider multiagent learning, specifically using the Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent, and analyze its convergence to equilibria in the simultaneous-game version of competitive opinion optimization.
期刊介绍:
Theoretical Computer Science is mathematical and abstract in spirit, but it derives its motivation from practical and everyday computation. Its aim is to understand the nature of computation and, as a consequence of this understanding, provide more efficient methodologies. All papers introducing or studying mathematical, logic and formal concepts and methods are welcome, provided that their motivation is clearly drawn from the field of computing.