Forward contracting and the endogenous activity of heterogeneous firms

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2024-08-12 DOI:10.1111/jems.12610
Sébastien Mitraille, Henry Thille
{"title":"Forward contracting and the endogenous activity of heterogeneous firms","authors":"Sébastien Mitraille, Henry Thille","doi":"10.1111/jems.12610","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Forward contracting in an ‐firm quantity‐setting oligopoly with heterogeneous costs introduces the possibility that relatively efficient firms deter the activity of inefficient rivals by reducing their margins. The equilibrium number of firms producing positive quantities can be any of depending on the level of demand relative to firm‐specific activity thresholds, with more firms active at higher demand levels. If only one firm is active, the Bertrand outcome is obtained. This potential reduction of the number of active firms may lessen the procompetitive effect of forward sales, but does not eliminate it entirely. We explore the competition policy implications of the endogenous activity of firms, in particular for merger analysis.","PeriodicalId":47931,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economics & Management Strategy","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12610","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Forward contracting in an ‐firm quantity‐setting oligopoly with heterogeneous costs introduces the possibility that relatively efficient firms deter the activity of inefficient rivals by reducing their margins. The equilibrium number of firms producing positive quantities can be any of depending on the level of demand relative to firm‐specific activity thresholds, with more firms active at higher demand levels. If only one firm is active, the Bertrand outcome is obtained. This potential reduction of the number of active firms may lessen the procompetitive effect of forward sales, but does not eliminate it entirely. We explore the competition policy implications of the endogenous activity of firms, in particular for merger analysis.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
远期合约和异质企业的内生活动
在具有异质成本的企业数量确定型寡头垄断中,远期合约引入了一种可能性,即效率相对较高的企业通过降低利润率来阻止效率较低的竞争对手的活动。生产正数量的均衡企业数量可以是任何一种,这取决于相对于特定企业活动阈值的需求水平,需求水平越高,活跃的企业数量越多。如果只有一家企业活跃,则会出现伯特兰结果。活跃企业数量的这种潜在减少可能会削弱远期销售的促进竞争效应,但不会完全消除这种效应。我们探讨了企业内生活动对竞争政策的影响,尤其是对兼并分析的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
期刊最新文献
Vertical mergers without foreclosure Dynamic competition for customer memberships Forward contracting and the endogenous activity of heterogeneous firms On fraud and certification of green production Issue Information
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1