Contempt, fear, and hubris: the 2008 Russian–Georgian war through the lens of affect

Abstract

Three affective phenomena epitomise the downturn in Russian–Western relations and shed light on a watershed moment—the invasion of Georgia in August 2008: contempt, fear, and hubris. Each promotes distinct appraisal patterns and action tendencies. Following a shift in the construction of Russian identity vis-à-vis Europe, elite attitudes towards the West turned contemptuous. Faced with a security crisis in the Caucasus, the perceived consequences of inaction fostered the decision to attack Georgia with overwhelming force. Exacerbating the situation, both leaders were overconfident with respect to the outcome of a military confrontation. By highlighting the behavioural manifestations of these affective responses, this article reevaluates predominant accounts of the conflict, informed by major IR theories. It demonstrates the usefulness of emotion as a lens on foreign policy, addresses questions left open by prevailing narratives, and holds lessons for the impasse that is the current security dialogue between Russia and the West.