Evolutionary Game-Based New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Strategies That Consider Carbon Reduction and Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preferences

Abstract

The rapid development of the new energy industry has intensified the competition among companies. Finding solutions to achieve technological innovation, carbon reduction, and to earn consumers’ confidence has become a pressing challenge. In this research, we aim to develop a four-party evolutionary game model involving government, manufacturers, dealers, and consumers to examine the strategic decisions made by these parties in order to accomplish carbon emission reduction goals. We will perform numerical simulations to analyze the strategic choices of each party and the relevant influencing factors. The results suggest the following: (1) The tax hike on traditional car production is less than the innovation expenses for new energy vehicles, leading manufacturers to lean towards manufacturing traditional vehicles. (2) The rise in taxes resulting from the manufacture of conventional vehicles will influence manufacturers’ strategic decisions, whereas the expenses related to technological advancements will have a more significant effect on manufacturers’ strategic choices. (3) Compared to dealers, manufacturers’ strategic choices are more significantly influenced by consumers’ awareness of low-carbon preferences. (4) In the early stages of technological innovation, the government typically offers incentive subsidies to manufacturers to boost technological innovation activities. Whereas, in the later stages of technological innovation, the government usually provides direct subsidies to consumers to encourage the market acceptance and widespread use of innovative products.