{"title":"Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games","authors":"Frédéric Koessler, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala","doi":"10.1287/moor.2023.0278","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider multipopulation Bayesian games with a large number of players. Each player aims at minimizing a cost function that depends on this player’s own action, the distribution of players’ actions in all populations, and an unknown state parameter. We study the nonatomic limit versions of these games and introduce the concept of Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibrium, which extends the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium to nonatomic games. We prove that Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibria are limits of action flows induced by Bayes correlated equilibria of the game with a large finite set of small players. For nonatomic games with complete information admitting a convex potential, we prove that the set of correlated and of coarse correlated Wardrop equilibria coincide with the set of probability distributions over Wardrop equilibria and that all equilibrium outcomes have the same costs. We get the following consequences. First, all flow distributions of (coarse) correlated equilibria in convex potential games with finitely many players converge to mixtures of Wardrop equilibria when the weight of each player tends to zero. Second, for any sequence of flows satisfying a no-regret property, its empirical distribution converges to the set of distributions over Wardrop equilibria, and the average cost converges to the unique Wardrop cost.Funding: This work was partially supported by European Cooperation in Science and Technology Action 16228 GAMENET. F. Koessler acknowledges the support of the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant StratCom ANR-19-CE26-0010-01]. M. Scarsini acknowledges the support of the Gruppo Nazionale per l’Analisi Matematica, la Probabilità e le loro Applicazioni project [Grant CUP_E53C22001930001], the Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale [Grant 2022EKNE5K], and the European Union-Next Generation EU, component M4C2, investment 1.1 (Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza) [Grant P2022XT8C8]. T. Tomala gratefully acknowledges the support of the HEC foundation and Agence Nationale de la Recherche/Investissements d’Avenir [Grant ANR-11-IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047].","PeriodicalId":49852,"journal":{"name":"Mathematics of Operations Research","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mathematics of Operations Research","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2023.0278","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MATHEMATICS, APPLIED","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We consider multipopulation Bayesian games with a large number of players. Each player aims at minimizing a cost function that depends on this player’s own action, the distribution of players’ actions in all populations, and an unknown state parameter. We study the nonatomic limit versions of these games and introduce the concept of Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibrium, which extends the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium to nonatomic games. We prove that Bayes correlated Wardrop equilibria are limits of action flows induced by Bayes correlated equilibria of the game with a large finite set of small players. For nonatomic games with complete information admitting a convex potential, we prove that the set of correlated and of coarse correlated Wardrop equilibria coincide with the set of probability distributions over Wardrop equilibria and that all equilibrium outcomes have the same costs. We get the following consequences. First, all flow distributions of (coarse) correlated equilibria in convex potential games with finitely many players converge to mixtures of Wardrop equilibria when the weight of each player tends to zero. Second, for any sequence of flows satisfying a no-regret property, its empirical distribution converges to the set of distributions over Wardrop equilibria, and the average cost converges to the unique Wardrop cost.Funding: This work was partially supported by European Cooperation in Science and Technology Action 16228 GAMENET. F. Koessler acknowledges the support of the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant StratCom ANR-19-CE26-0010-01]. M. Scarsini acknowledges the support of the Gruppo Nazionale per l’Analisi Matematica, la Probabilità e le loro Applicazioni project [Grant CUP_E53C22001930001], the Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale [Grant 2022EKNE5K], and the European Union-Next Generation EU, component M4C2, investment 1.1 (Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza) [Grant P2022XT8C8]. T. Tomala gratefully acknowledges the support of the HEC foundation and Agence Nationale de la Recherche/Investissements d’Avenir [Grant ANR-11-IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047].
我们考虑的是有大量参与者的多种群贝叶斯博弈。每个博弈者的目标都是最小化成本函数,该函数取决于博弈者自身的行动、博弈者在所有种群中的行动分布以及一个未知的状态参数。我们研究了这些博弈的非原子极限版本,并引入了贝叶斯相关沃德洛普均衡的概念,它将贝叶斯相关均衡的概念扩展到了非原子博弈。我们证明,贝叶斯相关沃德洛普均衡是有大量有限小博弈者的博弈的贝叶斯相关均衡所诱导的行动流的极限。对于具有完整信息且允许凸势能的非原子博弈,我们证明相关和粗相关的沃德洛普均衡集与沃德洛普均衡的概率分布集重合,并且所有均衡结果的代价相同。我们会得到以下结果。首先,当每个博弈者的权重趋于零时,有限多博弈者的凸势能博弈中(粗)相关均衡的所有流量分布都会趋近于沃德罗普均衡的混合物。其次,对于任何满足无悔属性的流量序列,其经验分布都会收敛到沃德罗普均衡状态的分布集合,平均成本也会收敛到唯一的沃德罗普成本:这项工作得到了欧洲科技合作行动 16228 GAMENET 的部分支持。F. Koessler 感谢 Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant StratCom ANR-19-CE26-0010-01] 的支持。M. Scarsini 感谢 Gruppo Nazionale per l'Analisi Matematica, la Probabilità e le loro Applicazioni 项目[CUP_E53C22001930001]、Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale [2022EKNE5K]和欧盟-下一代欧盟 M4C2 部分投资 1 的支持。1 (Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza) [Grant P2022XT8C8]。T. Tomala 感谢 HEC 基金会和 Agence Nationale de la Recherche/Investissements d'Avenir [Grant ANR-11-IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047] 的支持。
期刊介绍:
Mathematics of Operations Research is an international journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). The journal invites articles concerned with the mathematical and computational foundations in the areas of continuous, discrete, and stochastic optimization; mathematical programming; dynamic programming; stochastic processes; stochastic models; simulation methodology; control and adaptation; networks; game theory; and decision theory. Also sought are contributions to learning theory and machine learning that have special relevance to decision making, operations research, and management science. The emphasis is on originality, quality, and importance; correctness alone is not sufficient. Significant developments in operations research and management science not having substantial mathematical interest should be directed to other journals such as Management Science or Operations Research.