The origin and function of arbitrary signals: Making false statements, having long hair, and smoking Virginia Slims

Abstract

We propose a model in which players take actions that run counter to social norms in part to announce their stand on a social controversy but also, and maybe mostly, to gain image benefits that allow them to join groups that are socially attractive to them. We give several examples, but the “election denial” debate is an important application: Rather than assuming that proponents believe their claims to be true, it suggests that false statements can serve as symbolic actions and help them engage in self-branding for social and psychological gain. Specifically, the willingness to make a controversial statement can be a credible signal because untruth is ill-received by some members of society and therefore entails some costs. It is immaterial whether election deniers believe their claim to be true, but it is important that some members of society believe that it is false and therefore think poorly of those who make it: If there is social consensus about the truth of a statement, it cannot serve a signaling function. The same mechanism explains several other verbal and non-verbal signals associated with different sides of social controversies and analysis of those helps clarify the mechanism.