Government environmental signals, government–Enterprise collusion and corporate pollution transfer

Abstract

To optimize the implementation of environmental policies and foster green development in China's economy, it is crucial to be vigilant about corporate pollution transfer behaviors and regulate collusive relationships between local governments and enterprises. This study introduces a theoretical four-way game model to explore the impact of corporate pollution transfer, considering environmental regulation by the central government and third-party oversight, as well as collusion between local governments and firms. Using data from China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021, this study examines whether polluting firms engage in pollution transfer in response to environmental policies, with the Low-carbon City Pilot Policy (LCPP) serving as a proxy for government environmental signals. The findings reveal that the LCPP generally affects corporate pollution transfer. Mechanism analysis shows that the LCPP reduces pollution transfer through both formal and informal regulatory channels. Heterogeneity analysis further indicates that the pollution transfer effect is more pronounced in local state-owned enterprises, companies with a history of financial fraud, and highly polluting industries. Additionally, the study highlights that collusion between the government and enterprises promotes corporate pollution transfer, while changes in local government personnel disrupt this collusion and reduce pollution transfer. The research also identifies the supply chain as a key transmission path for pollution transfer. This work not only advances theoretical and empirical understanding of corporate behavior under environmental policy influence but also enriches research on government-enterprise relations and the effectiveness of environmental policies. It offers theoretical support and policy recommendations for constructing a rational green economic development system in China.