Optimal control strategies for infectious disease management: Integrating differential game theory with the SEIR model

Abstract

The rapid spread of infectious diseases poses a critical threat to global public health. Traditional frameworks, such as the Susceptible–Exposed–Infectious–Recovered (SEIR) model, have been crucial in elucidating disease dynamics. Nonetheless, these models frequently overlook the strategic interactions between public health authorities and individuals. This research extends the classic SEIR model by incorporating differential game theory to analyze optimal control strategies. By modeling the conflicting objectives of public health authorities aiming to minimize infection rates and intervention costs, and individuals seeking to reduce their infection risk and inconvenience, we derive a Nash equilibrium that provides a balanced approach to disease management. Using Picard’s iterative method, we solve the extended model to determine dynamic, optimal control strategies, revealing oscillatory behavior in public health interventions and individual preventive measures. This comprehensive approach offers valuable insights into the dynamic interactions essential for effective infectious disease control.