Debtholder responses to controlling shareholders’ share pledging

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance Pub Date : 2024-09-28 DOI:10.1016/j.qref.2024.101928
Xiaohui Hou, Xiaonan Lu
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Abstract

This study investigates debtholders’ responses to controlling shareholders’ share pledging. We found that share pledging by controlling shareholders is crucial for reducing agency costs. This lessens the information asymmetry of outsiders by strengthening pledgee supervision, and decreases companies’ risk-taking by adopting a relatively conservative investment strategy that hedges excessive risks. This also reduces the impact of insider control, decreases the interest spread, and increases the length of loan maturity. Further analyses show that the favorable effect of share pledging on bank loan covenants weakens for companies with a higher degree of financing deficit. Additionally, the role of share pledging varies with the agency costs of companies’ insider controls. The effects of share pledging on bank loan terms are more profound for companies with a higher degree of corporate governance performance. Robustness analyses addressing potential endogeneity further confirm our primary conclusions.
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债务人对控股股东股权质押的反应
本研究调查了债务人对控股股东股权质押的反应。我们发现,控股股东的股权质押对于降低代理成本至关重要。这可以通过加强质权人的监督来减少外部人的信息不对称,并通过采取相对保守的投资策略来对冲过高的风险,从而减少公司的风险承担。这也减少了内部人控制的影响,降低了利差,延长了贷款期限。进一步的分析表明,对于融资赤字程度较高的公司来说,股票质押对银行贷款契约的有利影响会减弱。此外,股权质押的作用还因公司内部人控制的代理成本而异。股份质押对银行贷款条件的影响对于公司治理绩效较高的公司更为显著。针对潜在内生性的稳健性分析进一步证实了我们的主要结论。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
2.90%
发文量
118
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (QREF) attracts and publishes high quality manuscripts that cover topics in the areas of economics, financial economics and finance. The subject matter may be theoretical, empirical or policy related. Emphasis is placed on quality, originality, clear arguments, persuasive evidence, intelligent analysis and clear writing. At least one Special Issue is published per year. These issues have guest editors, are devoted to a single theme and the papers have well known authors. In addition we pride ourselves in being able to provide three to four article "Focus" sections in most of our issues.
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