A Cross-Layer Game-Theoretic Approach to Resilient Control of Networked Switched Systems Against DoS Attacks

Abstract

This article investigates the resilient control strategies of networked switched systems (NSSs) against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and external disturbance. In the network layer, both the defender and the attacker allocate energy over multiple channels. Considering the impact of switching characteristic in the physical layer on the network layer, a dynamic regulating factor is proposed to adjust the total energy of the defender. To optimize the signal-to-interference-noise ratio and energy consumption simultaneously at each player’s side, a multiobjective game problem is formulated. Furthermore, a nondominated sorting genetic algorithm framework is employed, incorporating the knee point selection mechanism to attain the Pareto-Nash equilibrium, based on which the optimal defense strategy can be derived to achieve resilience against DoS attacks. In the physical-layer, taking the dynamic packet loss caused by DoS attacks and external disturbance into account, an $H_{\infty }$ minimax controller containing control inputs and the switching signal is designed to guarantee the optimal performance for NSSs through the dynamic game-theoretic approach. Finally, the networked continuous stirred tank reactor system is provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.