Bargaining Game-Based Pricing for Electric Vehicle Roaming Charging Services

IF 8.3 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC IEEE Transactions on Transportation Electrification Pub Date : 2024-10-18 DOI:10.1109/TTE.2024.3481252
Shuying Lai;Zhao Yang Dong;Yuechuan Tao;Christine Yip;Jing Qiu;Junhua Zhao
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Abstract

The burgeoning of electric vehicles (EVs) has led to an imperative to strengthen the interoperability among various charging facilities in different charging networks. To achieve interoperability, EV roaming, facilitated by the roaming protocol, can be implemented to facilitate data exchange among entities. To this end, it is important to design a pricing strategy that can ensure that all charging point operators (CPOs) follow the EV roaming protocol and allow for greater mobility of EV users. Hence, in this article, we propose a pricing strategy for EV roaming charging services. First, the charging interaction between CPOs and EV users under the same EV roaming protocol is analyzed, which emphasizes its holistic approach to understanding user dynamics in the EV charging market. Second, a bargaining game-based pricing strategy, specifically drawing from the Nash–Harsanyi game framework, is proposed to ascertain the markup fee and the optimal bargaining price for each participating CPO operating under a unified EV roaming protocol. Third, three types of irrational behaviors of EV users are mathematically modeled by applying mental accounting theory. The numerical results show that the proposed pricing strategy can facilitate CPOs to earn higher net profits on average and enhance the utility of EV users.
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基于讨价还价游戏的电动汽车漫游充电服务定价
随着电动汽车的蓬勃发展,加强不同充电网络中各种充电设施之间的互操作性势在必行。为了实现互操作性,可以在漫游协议的推动下实现EV漫游,以促进实体之间的数据交换。为此,重要的是设计一个定价策略,以确保所有充电点运营商(CPOs)遵循电动汽车漫游协议,并允许电动汽车用户更大的移动性。因此,本文提出了一种电动汽车漫游收费服务的定价策略。首先,分析了相同漫游协议下CPOs与电动汽车用户之间的充电交互,强调了其整体理解电动汽车充电市场用户动态的方法。其次,借鉴Nash-Harsanyi博弈框架,提出了一种基于议价博弈的定价策略,以确定在统一EV漫游协议下各参与CPO的加成费和最优议价。第三,运用心理会计理论对电动汽车用户的三种非理性行为进行数学建模。数值计算结果表明,所提出的定价策略可以使CPOs获得更高的平均净利润,并提高电动汽车用户的效用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Transportation Electrification
IEEE Transactions on Transportation Electrification Engineering-Electrical and Electronic Engineering
CiteScore
12.20
自引率
15.70%
发文量
449
期刊介绍: IEEE Transactions on Transportation Electrification is focused on components, sub-systems, systems, standards, and grid interface technologies related to power and energy conversion, propulsion, and actuation for all types of electrified vehicles including on-road, off-road, off-highway, and rail vehicles, airplanes, and ships.
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