Coordination of Multi-Agent Orderly Charging via an Incentive-Compatible Mechanism

Abstract

As the cyber-physical system is developed into cyber-physical-social system, the importance of social factors is growing in the interaction between electric vehicle (EV) and power system. This paper aims to develop an incentive-compatible mechanism to coordinate multi-agent orderly charging. Firstly, the travel behaviors of EV cluster are simulated based on Monte Carlo sampling, and the load transfer model considering various social factors is constructed. Then, an orderly charging mechanism involving multiple agents based on Nash bargaining theory is proposed. In the first stage, the total profit of electric vehicle user, power grid company (PGC), and charge station operator is maximized. In the second stage, the revenue of each agent after participating in the cooperation is improved by transfer payment. Next, the carbon trading mechanism is applied in the incentive compatibility model, and the revenue of PGC participating in the carbon market under different scenarios and constraints are calculated. Finally, by comparing with the existing model, the simulation results show that the proposed multi-agent coordinated orderly charging model can reduce the pressure on the power grid caused by the randomness of EV travel, and through a fair profit distribution mechanism, it can maximize the social benefits of the coalition while increasing the revenue of each agent.