Strategic behavior in multi-criteria sorting with trust relationships-based consensus mechanism: Application in supply chain risk management

Abstract

Strategic behavior is common in multi-criteria sorting, where manipulated alternatives are allocated to the target category to achieve the intended goal. Engaging in such strategic behavior in sorting consensus often comes at a cost, which is closely tied to the degree of preference adjustments and the level of trust relationships among decision makers. This study investigates strategic behavior using piecewise cost-based consensus mechanism in social trust network. Firstly, the trust relationship dependent piecewise cost is formally defined and formulated by considering the impact of trust relationship on the preference adjustments willingness to achieve sorting consensus. Then, based on the trust relationship dependent piecewise cost, a preference strategic manipulation model is proposed to achieve strategic behavior in sorting consensus, which is implemented by minimizing the cost of strategically guiding decision makers in adjusting their preferences. Considering that social trust network affects strategic manipulation, a preference-network collaborative strategic manipulation model is further proposed, which is designed to strategically guide decision makers in adjusting both their preferences and social trust networks. Moreover, the practicality of proposed strategic manipulation models is exemplified through a case study on supply chain risk management and their performance is validated via simulation analysis.