On the incentive properties of revenue cap regulation

IF 14.2 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Energy Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-01 Epub Date: 2024-11-20 DOI:10.1016/j.eneco.2024.108052
Dennis L. Weisman
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Abstract

Revenue cap regulation (RCR) is increasingly common in the energy sector because it purportedly reduces the regulated firm's disincentive to promote conservation. In comparison with price-cap regulation, RCR can yield higher prices, greater energy conservation, lower service quality and decreased cost-reducing innovation. The distortionary effects of earnings sharing on investment in cost-reducing innovation may be lessened under RCR. These properties hold even when the regulated firm is further constrained with a price cap that is set equal to the minimum price that satisfies the RCR constraint.
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论收入上限规制的激励性质
收入上限管制(RCR)在能源部门越来越普遍,因为据称它减少了被监管公司促进节能的抑制因素。与价格上限管制相比,RCR可以产生更高的价格,更大的节能,更低的服务质量和减少成本的创新。在RCR下,收益分享对降低成本创新投资的扭曲效应可能会减弱。即使受监管的公司受到价格上限的进一步限制,即设定为满足RCR约束的最低价格,这些属性仍然保持不变。
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来源期刊
Energy Economics
Energy Economics ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
18.60
自引率
12.50%
发文量
524
期刊介绍: Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.
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