{"title":"Query-Efficient Model Inversion Attacks: An Information Flow View","authors":"Yixiao Xu;Binxing Fang;Mohan Li;Xiaolei Liu;Zhihong Tian","doi":"10.1109/TIFS.2024.3518779","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Model Inversion Attacks (MIAs) pose a certain threat to the data privacy of learning-based systems, as they enable adversaries to reconstruct identifiable features of the training distribution with only query access to the victim model. In the context of deep learning, the primary challenges associated with MIAs are suboptimal attack success rates and the corresponding high computational costs. Prior efforts assumed that the expansive search space caused these limitations, employing generative models to constrain the dimensions of the search space. Despite the initial success of these generative-based solutions, recent experiments have cast doubt on this fundamental assumption, leaving two open questions about the influential factors determining MIA performance and how to manipulate these factors to improve MIAs. To answer these questions, we reframe MIAs from the perspective of information flow. This new formulation allows us to establish a lower bound for the error probability of MIAs, determined by two critical factors: (1) the size of the search space and (2) the mutual information between input and output random variables. Through a detailed analysis of generative-based MIAs within this theoretical framework, we uncover a trade-off between the size of the search space and the generation capability of generative models. Based on the theoretical conclusions, we introduce the Query-Efficient Model Inversion Approach (QE-MIA). By strategically selecting an appropriate search space and introducing additional mutual information, QE-MIA achieves a reduction of <inline-formula> <tex-math>$60\\%\\sim 70\\%$ </tex-math></inline-formula> in query overhead while concurrently enhancing the attack success rate by <inline-formula> <tex-math>$5\\%\\sim 25\\%$ </tex-math></inline-formula>.","PeriodicalId":13492,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security","volume":"20 ","pages":"1023-1036"},"PeriodicalIF":6.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10807137/","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Model Inversion Attacks (MIAs) pose a certain threat to the data privacy of learning-based systems, as they enable adversaries to reconstruct identifiable features of the training distribution with only query access to the victim model. In the context of deep learning, the primary challenges associated with MIAs are suboptimal attack success rates and the corresponding high computational costs. Prior efforts assumed that the expansive search space caused these limitations, employing generative models to constrain the dimensions of the search space. Despite the initial success of these generative-based solutions, recent experiments have cast doubt on this fundamental assumption, leaving two open questions about the influential factors determining MIA performance and how to manipulate these factors to improve MIAs. To answer these questions, we reframe MIAs from the perspective of information flow. This new formulation allows us to establish a lower bound for the error probability of MIAs, determined by two critical factors: (1) the size of the search space and (2) the mutual information between input and output random variables. Through a detailed analysis of generative-based MIAs within this theoretical framework, we uncover a trade-off between the size of the search space and the generation capability of generative models. Based on the theoretical conclusions, we introduce the Query-Efficient Model Inversion Approach (QE-MIA). By strategically selecting an appropriate search space and introducing additional mutual information, QE-MIA achieves a reduction of $60\%\sim 70\%$ in query overhead while concurrently enhancing the attack success rate by $5\%\sim 25\%$ .
模型反转攻击(mia)对基于学习的系统的数据隐私构成了一定的威胁,因为它们使攻击者能够仅通过对受害者模型的查询访问来重建训练分布的可识别特征。在深度学习的背景下,与MIAs相关的主要挑战是次优攻击成功率和相应的高计算成本。先前的研究假设是庞大的搜索空间造成了这些限制,使用生成模型来约束搜索空间的维度。尽管这些基于生成的解决方案取得了初步成功,但最近的实验对这一基本假设提出了质疑,留下了两个悬而未决的问题,即决定MIA性能的影响因素以及如何操纵这些因素来改善MIA。为了回答这些问题,我们从信息流的角度重新构建mia。这个新公式允许我们建立mia错误概率的下界,它由两个关键因素决定:(1)搜索空间的大小和(2)输入和输出随机变量之间的互信息。通过在该理论框架内对基于生成的MIAs的详细分析,我们发现了搜索空间大小与生成模型的生成能力之间的权衡。在理论结论的基础上,提出了查询高效模型反演方法(Query-Efficient Model Inversion Approach, QE-MIA)。通过战略性地选择适当的搜索空间并引入额外的互信息,QE-MIA实现了查询开销减少60\%至70\%,同时将攻击成功率提高了5\%至25\%。
期刊介绍:
The IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security covers the sciences, technologies, and applications relating to information forensics, information security, biometrics, surveillance and systems applications that incorporate these features