Eyes on the Ball: Activist Campaigns and Management’s Response at the Operational Level

IF 9.3 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Journal of Management Pub Date : 2024-12-29 DOI:10.1177/01492063241305053
Razvan Lungeanu, Margarethe Wiersema
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

More than 45% of the S&P 500 have been the target of activist investors. As a major shareholder in the firms they target, activist investors’ campaigns raise concerns over the firm’s poor performance and pose a threat to management’s control over the firm. Prior research has found that activist campaigns have significant consequences, as management curtails long-term investments, divests businesses, and foregoes acquisitions. Strategic decisions at the corporate level, however, do not provide insight as to whether activist investors motivate management to improve the operational competitiveness of the firm. Our study seeks to address whether activist campaigns succeed in motivating management to improve the firm’s operational competitiveness. This represents an important issue since the firm’s operational practices are essential to its competitiveness and performance. Our study proposes and finds that firms targeted by activist investors seek new ways by which to improve the firm’s operational efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, the management of target firms shift their emphasis to tactics that can improve the firm’s operations in the short-term. We use a measure of operational competitiveness that provides detail and granularity at a tactical level, enabling us to compare and contrast how firms respond to activist investors at the operational level of the firm. Thus, our study provides important insights not previously found that activist campaigns motivate management to improve the firm’s operational competitiveness.
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期刊介绍: The Journal of Management (JOM) aims to publish rigorous empirical and theoretical research articles that significantly contribute to the field of management. It is particularly interested in papers that have a strong impact on the overall management discipline. JOM also encourages the submission of novel ideas and fresh perspectives on existing research. The journal covers a wide range of areas, including business strategy and policy, organizational behavior, human resource management, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and research methods. It provides a platform for scholars to present their work on these topics and fosters intellectual discussion and exchange in these areas.
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