The do‐able solution to the interface problem

IF 1.3 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH Pub Date : 2025-01-19 DOI:10.1111/phpr.13139
Yair Levy
{"title":"The do‐able solution to the interface problem","authors":"Yair Levy","doi":"10.1111/phpr.13139","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers and cognitive scientists increasingly recognize the need to appeal to <jats:italic>motor representations</jats:italic> over and above intentions in attempting to understand how action is planned and executed. But doing so gives rise to a puzzle, which has come to be known as “the Interface Problem”: How is it that intentions and motor representations manage to interface in producing action? The question has semed puzzling, because each state is thought to be formatted differently: Intention has propositional format, whereas the format of motor representation is motoric. My primary goal here is to defend a novel and attractive (dis)solution to the interface problem. I do so by connecting it with a rather different discussion about the format of intention, instigated by a minority of philosophers who reject the idea that intention should be construed as a propositional attitude. As I explain, the most compelling reason to accept the heterodox non‐propositional conception of intention actually holds the key also to explaining away the interface problem. In so doing, the heterodox conception itself gains further credibility.","PeriodicalId":48136,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13139","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Philosophers and cognitive scientists increasingly recognize the need to appeal to motor representations over and above intentions in attempting to understand how action is planned and executed. But doing so gives rise to a puzzle, which has come to be known as “the Interface Problem”: How is it that intentions and motor representations manage to interface in producing action? The question has semed puzzling, because each state is thought to be formatted differently: Intention has propositional format, whereas the format of motor representation is motoric. My primary goal here is to defend a novel and attractive (dis)solution to the interface problem. I do so by connecting it with a rather different discussion about the format of intention, instigated by a minority of philosophers who reject the idea that intention should be construed as a propositional attitude. As I explain, the most compelling reason to accept the heterodox non‐propositional conception of intention actually holds the key also to explaining away the interface problem. In so doing, the heterodox conception itself gains further credibility.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
接口问题的可行解决方案
哲学家和认知科学家越来越认识到,在试图理解行动是如何计划和执行的过程中,除了意图之外,还需要诉诸运动表征。但这样做会产生一个难题,即 "界面问题":意向和运动表象是如何在产生动作的过程中相互结合的?这个问题一直令人费解,因为人们认为每种状态的格式都不同:意向具有命题格式,而运动表征的格式是运动性的。在这里,我的主要目的是为界面问题提出一个新颖而有吸引力的(非)解决方案。少数哲学家拒绝接受意图应被解释为命题态度的观点,他们发起了一场关于意图格式的讨论。正如我所解释的,接受异端的非命题意向概念的最令人信服的理由实际上也是解释界面问题的关键所在。这样一来,异端概念本身就获得了进一步的可信性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
3.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required for submissions.
期刊最新文献
Creativity as a higher agency A modal theory of justification Whose public reason? Which reasonableness? From singular to plural. . . and beyond? An interpersonal form of faith
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1