The do‐able solution to the interface problem

Abstract

Philosophers and cognitive scientists increasingly recognize the need to appeal to motor representations over and above intentions in attempting to understand how action is planned and executed. But doing so gives rise to a puzzle, which has come to be known as “the Interface Problem”: How is it that intentions and motor representations manage to interface in producing action? The question has semed puzzling, because each state is thought to be formatted differently: Intention has propositional format, whereas the format of motor representation is motoric. My primary goal here is to defend a novel and attractive (dis)solution to the interface problem. I do so by connecting it with a rather different discussion about the format of intention, instigated by a minority of philosophers who reject the idea that intention should be construed as a propositional attitude. As I explain, the most compelling reason to accept the heterodox non‐propositional conception of intention actually holds the key also to explaining away the interface problem. In so doing, the heterodox conception itself gains further credibility.