An evolutionary game theory for event-driven ecological population dynamics.

Abstract

Despite being a powerful tool to model ecological interactions, traditional evolutionary game theory can still be largely improved in the context of population dynamics. One of the current challenges is to devise a cohesive theoretical framework for ecological games with density-dependent (or concentration-dependent) evolution, especially one defined by individual-level events. In this work, I use the notation of reaction networks as a foundation to propose a framework and show that classic two-strategy games are a particular case of the theory. The framework exhibits a strong versatility and provides a standardized language for model design, and I demonstrate its use through a simple example of mating dynamics and parental care. In addition, reaction networks provide a natural connection between stochastic and deterministic dynamics and therefore are suitable to model noise effects on small populations, also allowing the use of stochastic simulation algorithms such as Gillespie's with game models. The methods I present can help to bring evolutionary game theory to new reaches in ecology, facilitate the process of model design, and put different models on a common ground.