Reducing cheap talk? How monetary incentives affect the accuracy of metamemory judgments.

Abstract

The accuracy of metacognitive judgments is rarely incentivized in experiments; hence, it depends on the participants' willingness to invest cognitive resources and respond truthfully. According to arguments promoted in economic research that performance cannot reach its full potential without proper motivation, metacognitive abilities might therefore have been underestimated. In two experiments (N = 128 and N = 129), we explored the impact of incentives on the accuracy of judgments of learning (JOLs), memory performance, and cue use in free recall of word lists. We introduced a payoff scheme with 5 cents maximum per judgment to promote the accuracy of predicting recall success while simultaneously discouraging strategic responding in the memory test. Incentivizing JOLs had no effect on memory performance. Metacognitive accuracy in terms of resolution (Kruskal's Gamma) was slightly improved in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2. On the more negative side, the incentives boosted JOLs indiscriminately, producing substantial overconfidence. A deeper analysis including cues like word concreteness, imagery, arousal, frequency, subjective relevance, and font size showed the usual and simultaneous cue effects on JOLs. However, cue effects were largely unaffected in size by incentivizing JOLs. In summary, incentives for accuracy do not improve the resolution of JOLs to an extent that outweighs the large inflation of overconfidence. Based on the current results, one cannot recommend the future use of incentivized studies in the field of metamemory.