Actuator and Sensor Attacks Against Multisensor State Estimation With Round-Robin Protocol

Abstract

In this article, we focus on the security issue of multisensor state estimation under actuator and sensor attacks. Due to the limitation of network bandwidth, we consider a scenario where the sensor data is transmitted following a round-robin protocol. If attacks can access all actuator and sensor channels, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of joint attacks are presented. In this case, the attacks can cause the estimation to diverge while the corrupted innovation remains the same as that of the healthy system. When the attacked actuator or sensor channels are constrained, the existence of such a joint attack is investigated by taking into account the kernel space of system matrices. If only the sensor data are compromised, there is no strictly stealthy sensor attack, and we discuss the existence of sensor attacks with a relaxed stealthiness. The simulations are carried out on an autonomous aircraft system and an IEEE 6-bus power system to verify the effectiveness of the developed theoretical results.