PPCA: Privacy-Preserving Continuous Authentication Scheme With Consistency Proof for Zero-Trust Architecture Networks

Abstract

Continuous authentication (CA) has been widely applied by network service providers to verify user identities in finance, healthcare, and e-commerce fields. However, in next-generation networks, CA faces the risk of user privacy leakage due to its dependence on a verifier-centric authentication model, and verifiers may not always be trustworthy, particularly in zero-trust architecture networks. Existing privacy protection schemes face challenges in solving this problem because these schemes will weaken the linkability of context requests, leading to difficulties in consistency checks for fine-grained CA. To fill the gap, this article proposes a privacy-preserving CA (PPCA) scheme by incorporating anonymous self-sovereign identity and fine-grained CA. Specifically, PPCA exploits subset proof to enable users to reveal only the minimum necessary identity data for selective disclosure. To support fine-grained CA, we construct a new consistency proof for the anonymous user to prove that the different credentials are bound to the same attributes set, where the user is responsible for deciding whether to send the consistency proof. PPCA is formalized, defined, and constructed based on BLS signatures, Set Commitment, and Sigma Protocol. The security analysis shows that PPCA is correct and sound and supports user anonymity and credential consistency at the same time. The performance evaluation shows that PPCA requires only minimal additional time cost, achieving an optimal balance between security and efficiency.