{"title":"Deliberation and Voting: A Matter of Truth or Taste","authors":"Masayuki Odora","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70013","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n <p>This study examines the strategic communication that occurs before voting under various voting rules. A group of imperfectly informed voters communicate before casting their votes in binary elections. The voters have <i>partially conflicting interests</i>: there is a correct candidate in some states of the world, while in others, voters disagree, and ideologies matter. This study demonstrates that truthful communication is never an equilibrium under any voting rule when the size of the electorate is sufficiently large.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpet.70013","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study examines the strategic communication that occurs before voting under various voting rules. A group of imperfectly informed voters communicate before casting their votes in binary elections. The voters have partially conflicting interests: there is a correct candidate in some states of the world, while in others, voters disagree, and ideologies matter. This study demonstrates that truthful communication is never an equilibrium under any voting rule when the size of the electorate is sufficiently large.
期刊介绍：
As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.
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