Unveiling the veiled: An early stage detection of fileless malware

IF 5.4 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS Computers & Security Pub Date : 2025-03-01 Epub Date: 2024-12-16 DOI:10.1016/j.cose.2024.104231
Narendra Singh, Somanath Tripathy
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Abstract

The threat actors continuously evolve their tactics and techniques in a novel form to evade traditional security solutions. Fileless malware attacks are one such advancement, which operates directly within system memory, leaving no footprint on the disk, so became challenging to detect. Meanwhile, the current state-of-the-art approaches detect fileless attacks at the final (post-infection) stage, although, detecting attacks at an early-stage is crucial to prevent potential damage and data breaches. In this work, we propose an early-stage detection system named Argus to detect fileless malware at early-stage. Argus extracts key features from acquired memory dumps of suspicious processes in real-time and generates explained features. It then correlates the explained features with the MITRE ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) framework to identify fileless malware attacks before their operational stage. The experimental results show that Argus could successfully identify, 4356 fileless malware samples (out of 5026 samples) during the operational stage. Specifically, 2978 samples are detected in the pre-operational phase, while 1378 samples are detected in the operational phase.
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揭开面纱:无文件恶意软件的早期检测
威胁行为者不断以新的形式发展其战术和技术,以逃避传统的安全解决方案。无文件恶意软件攻击就是这样一种进步,它直接在系统内存中操作,不会在磁盘上留下任何足迹,因此很难检测到。与此同时,目前最先进的方法是在最后(感染后)阶段检测无文件攻击,尽管早期检测攻击对于防止潜在的损害和数据泄露至关重要。在这项工作中,我们提出了一个名为Argus的早期检测系统,用于早期检测无文件恶意软件。Argus从获得的可疑进程的实时内存转储中提取关键特征,并生成解释的特征。然后,它将所解释的特性与MITRE ATT&;CK(对抗性战术、技术和常识)框架相关联,以在操作阶段之前识别无文件恶意软件攻击。实验结果表明,Argus在运行阶段能够成功识别5026个样本中的4356个无文件恶意软件样本。具体来说,在预操作阶段检测到2978个样本,而在操作阶段检测到1378个样本。
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来源期刊
Computers & Security
Computers & Security 工程技术-计算机:信息系统
CiteScore
12.40
自引率
7.10%
发文量
365
审稿时长
10.7 months
期刊介绍: Computers & Security is the most respected technical journal in the IT security field. With its high-profile editorial board and informative regular features and columns, the journal is essential reading for IT security professionals around the world. Computers & Security provides you with a unique blend of leading edge research and sound practical management advice. It is aimed at the professional involved with computer security, audit, control and data integrity in all sectors - industry, commerce and academia. Recognized worldwide as THE primary source of reference for applied research and technical expertise it is your first step to fully secure systems.
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