On the core of information sharing games

IF 0.8 4区管理学 Q4 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-01-27 DOI:10.1016/j.orl.2025.107247

Yasuo Sasaki

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Information sharing games deal with allocating payoffs created by information sharing among agents in the cooperative-game approach. In this study, we preset several properties of the core of those games, such as a necessary and sufficient condition for the singleton core and simple computation of an agent's maximum payoff in the core.

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来源期刊

Operations Research Letters 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

111

审稿时长

83 days

期刊介绍： Operations Research Letters is committed to the rapid review and fast publication of short articles on all aspects of operations research and analytics. Apart from a limitation to eight journal pages, quality, originality, relevance and clarity are the only criteria for selecting the papers to be published. ORL covers the broad field of optimization, stochastic models and game theory. Specific areas of interest include networks, routing, location, queueing, scheduling, inventory, reliability, and financial engineering. We wish to explore interfaces with other fields such as life sciences and health care, artificial intelligence and machine learning, energy distribution, and computational social sciences and humanities. Our traditional strength is in methodology, including theory, modelling, algorithms and computational studies. We also welcome novel applications and concise literature reviews.

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