High Cost of Scientific Ignorance: A Conceptual Foundation for Scientific Literacy in the Courts

Abstract

This paper examines the failure of Daubert, using analysis from case law, legal scholarship, social psychology, and the philosophy of science to map out the scope of the problem. Next, it provides a diagnostic situated within recent work in social epistemology that highlights structural challenges in the contemporary epistemic landscape. Although the problem of the misuse of science in the courtroom has many different dimensions, one underexplored facet is the courtroom as an instance of broader structural problems in the management of authority, ignorance, and expertise. Building on this analysis, the authors identify five key scientific concepts: (1) the source of scientific authority is derived from consensus within a critical community; (2) falsification, rather than confirmation, is a primary methodological commitment; (3) uncertainty and ignorance in scientific inquiry can managed, but not eliminated; (4) there is a difference between performative, disingenuous pseudoskepticism and a skeptical, critical perspective; and (5) one should be able to recognize genuine scientific expertise and should defer to that expertise. These five foundational ideas provide a conceptual footing for scientific literacy within courtrooms and a basis for educating legal professionals.